RESETTLEMENT POLICY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN THE UKRSSR IN THE 1920s

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of the article is to give an objective assessment of both the resettlement policy of the Soviet state and the practice of its implementation in Ukraine, to establish the stages of this policy, the causes of resettlement, their scale, the state and peculiarities of the organisation of resettlement affairs in the 1920s, and to show it as a period and a prerequisite for forced mass resettlement in the following years.

The scientific novelty of the research results lies in a new assessment of the resettlement policy of the Soviet authorities in the 1920s, the determination of the stages and principles of resettlement, the clarification of the factors that prompted the Ukrainian peasantry to change their place of residence, and the proof of the inability of the state authorities to establish an appropriate social–economic policy and solving the issue of agrarian overpopulation. The article shows the use of the resettlement organised by the Soviet authorities to clear the border strip of “socially dangerous” elements. It is proved that the general line of the resettlement policy of the Soviet authorities in the 1920s was to replace spontaneous migrations with purposeful, planned and regulated measures, with a gradual transition to mass deportations.

Conclusions. The article is devoted to one of the important socio-economic problems of the history of the Soviet period – the resettlement policy of the Bolshevik government in the 1920s, which has not lost its relevance even today. Various aspects of resettlement from Ukraine in the 1920s remain understudied to this day. In this article, the problems of the resettlement of peasants in the period of the 1920s from the largest agrarian region of the USSR – Ukraine, are investigated on the basis of specific historical material, using the achievements of historiography and documents of the central archival institutions of the higher authorities and administration of Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Features of state policy, material and organisational capabilities of the resettlement case, causes, scales and difficulties of resettlement are shown.

Keywords: UkrSSR, RSFSR, USSR, People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs, peasantry, resettlement, Soviet government, colonisation fund
**НОВА ІСТОРІЯ**

**ПЕРЕСЕЛЕНСЬКА ПОЛІТИКА РАДЯНСЬКОЇ ВЛАДИ В УСРР 1920-х РР.**

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Анотація

**Meta статті** – дати об’єктивну оцінку як переселенській політиці радянської держави, так і практиці її реалізації в Україні, встановити етапи цієї політики, причини переселення, їх масштаби, стан і особливості організації переселенської справи в 1920-х рр. та показати це як період і передумову примусових масових переселень наступних років.

**Наукова новизна результатів дослідження полягає в новій оцінці переселенської політики органів радянської влади 1920-х рр., визначенні етапів та принципів здійснення переселень, з’ясуванні чинників, що спонукали українське селянство вдаватися до зміни місця проживання, доведенні неспроможності органів державної влади в налагодженні належної соціально-економічної політики та вирішення питання аграрного перенаселення. Показано використання радянською владою організованих переселень для зачистки прикордонної смуги від “соціально-небезпечних” елементів. Доведено, що генеральна лінія переселенської політики радянської влади 1920-х рр. полягала в заміні стихійних міграцій цілеспрямованими, планово-регульованими заходами, з поступовим переходом до масових депортацій.

**Висновки.** Статтю присвячено одній із важливих соціально-економічних проблем історії радянського періоду – переселенській політиці більшовицької влади 1920-х рр., яка не втратила актуальності і сьогодні. Різні аспекти переселення з України у 1920-х рр. і до сьогодні залишаються малодослідженими. У даній статті на конкретно-історичному матеріалі, з використанням здобутків історіографії та документів центральних архівних установ вищих органів влади та управління України і Російської Федерації досліджено проблеми переселення селян у період 1920-х рр. з найбільшого аграрного регіону СРСР – України. Показано особливості державної політики, матеріальні та організаційні можливості переселенської справи, причини, масштаби та складнощі переселення.

**Ключові слова:** УСРР, РСФРР, СРСР, Наркомат земельних справ, селянство, переселення, радянська влада, колонізаційний фонд

**INTRODUCTION**

Resettlement or migration is an integral part of human life. They include a significant range of motivations, forms, and scales that depend on specific historical conditions. Among them, a special place is occupied by socially oriented resettlement, which is characterised by massiveness and is caused, first of all, by economic and political factors.

Migration processes create a number of problems that require the state to take active steps to solve them. The resettlement policy of the Soviet government in the 1920s became a component of the country’s economic and social development strategy. State regulation of migration processes in the early period of the USSR became a problem, the solution of which required taking into account a whole set of factors,
including the scale of the territory, the settlement scheme, the length of the borders, the specifics of the development of individual regions, the state of the labor market, and many other issues.

In the 1920s, a special practice of migration management was formed, based on the so-called administrative approach, according to which an individual at any time, in accordance with political decisions, could be relocated to any point of the available geographical space, and not necessarily by violent methods. The government used various means of influence – moral, ideological, political and economic.

At the same time, the research literature lacks a unified and generally accepted position on the extent to which the resettlement of the 1920s became a prerequisite for the subsequent repressive policy and mass deportations of the population. The purpose of the article is to give an objective assessment of both the resettlement policy of the Soviet state and the practice of its implementation, to establish the stages of this policy, the reasons for resettlement, their scale, the state and peculiarities of the organisation of resettlement affairs in the 1920s, and to show it as a period and a prerequisite forced mass resettlement in the following years.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The resettlement policy of the Soviet government in the 1920s is one of the understudied topics. The historiography of the issue is represented by a small number of works by authors devoted to the study of both the immigration policy of the 1920s in general and its individual aspects. In Soviet historiography, mass resettlement was repeatedly studied both at the level of the entire USSR and at the level of regions. Back in the 1920s, experts who were directly involved in the planning of the migration policy left behind several works related to the analysis of migration campaigns, the characteristics of the regions of Siberia and the Far East, where the migration movement was mainly directed. Such works have not only some important conclusions, but also have become a valuable empirical base for new research. Some authors present an analysis of the natural increase in the population of the USSR in the 1920s, mathematical calculations of the ‘excess’ population are made, and the progress and main stages of the resettlement campaign are shown.

Researchers of the Soviet period associated the causes of mass resettlement with economic, demographic and socio-political factors. The authors provided generalising data on the causes of overpopulation in the regions of the USSR, and pointed out the relationship between the resettlement and national policies of the Bolshevik government. Scientific studies of the Soviet era bore the imprint of their era, and were subjective in evaluating the activities of the Soviet state and the Communist Party.

The current state of historical knowledge has largely changed approaches to topics that have already become the object of research by historians, including the problems of agrarian migrations in the USSR. The research interest of domestic scientists began

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1 Архипов Н.Б. Дальневосточный край. Москва; Ленинград, 1929. 156 с.; Дербер П.Я., Шер М.Л. Очерки хозяйственной жизни Дальнего Востока. Москва; Ленинград, 1927. 300 с.
2 Лубны-Герцык Л.И. Что такое перенаселение. Москва, 1923. 100 с.
3 Баранов М.Э. Переселение и коллективизация. Москва: Книгосоюз, 1929. 75 с.
4 Минц Л.Е. Аграрное перенаселение и рынок труда СССР. Москва-Ленинград: Гос. изд-во, 1929. 470 с.
to focus on topics that were previously covered by an ideological taboo and the label ‘completely secret’⁶. The authors analyse the content, forms and methods of the resettlement policy of the 1920s⁷, the peculiarities of its implementation in the national regions of Southern Ukraine⁸, the use of the ethnic factor by the Soviet authorities in this process⁹.

**DISCUSSION**

The coming of the Bolsheviks to power in October (November) 1917 dramatically changed the socio-political situation in the country, but put old problems on the agenda - first of all, the need for the promised solution to the land issue. The methods of solving it were also not new, we had to return to the resettlement practice used by the tsarist government. The Bolsheviks created an appropriate legal framework for agricultural resettlement. The beginning of its formation was laid back in November 1917 at the II Congress of Soviets with the adoption of the Decree on Land⁰. In its paragraph 8 of the second section, it was emphasised: “If the available land fund in certain localities turns out to be insufficient to meet the needs of the entire local population, then the surplus population shall be resettled”¹¹. At the same time, the state promised to take over the organisation of resettlement and provision of displaced persons.

The continuation of the decree ‘On land’ was the decree ‘On socialisation of land’¹², adopted by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (CEC) on February 19, 1918. Section VI of the decree confirmed the readiness of the state to bear the costs of resettlement measures, and also established the procedure for resettlement, formation of resettlement contingents, requirements for the colonisation fund, etc. The purpose of all these measures was summarised by V. Lenin, head of the National Committee of the RSFSR, emphasizing that “...our state must be able to send dozens and hundreds of workers to wherever the Soviet authorities need them”¹³.
The reasons for the resettlement policy of the USSR were, firstly, the fight against agrarian overpopulation (unemployment) in certain areas of the USSR, BSSR and the European part of the RSFSR. Special attention was paid to resettlement from the border strip. Secondly, the desire to bring new areas of uninhabited land into the economic cycle, that is, the expansion of the territorial base of agriculture and industry of the USSR. Resettlement of peasants was caused by a surplus of workers in the countryside and extremely low profitability of agriculture. The Bolshevik policy of land redistribution only slightly increased the land security of the peasantry. For example, in Bila Tserkva region, the average area of arable land per peasant farm was 2.9 dessiatina, and in the whole region, 78% of peasant farms had plots of less than 3 dessiatina. In the Kyiv district 70% of families owned 3 dessiatina of land, which did not meet the subsistence standards of agrarian support for their family members. Only about 8% of owners had 5 or more dessiatina of land corresponding to the subsistence level. In many families in the northern and northwestern regions of Ukraine, the allocation of arable land per family member generally amounted to 0.1-0.3 dessiatina. Such statistics testified that already in the early 1920s there was a steady trend towards massive dispossession of the peasantry. The problem of agrarian overpopulation was compounded by the extremely low gross income from agriculture per capita.

The resettlement policy of the Soviet government during the 1920s can be divided into two stages. The first stage falls on 1921-1925 and is characterized as a period of mainly self-resettlement and state containment of its intensity. During the second stage, which we will outline in 1925-1930, state regulation of migration processes was carried out with the aim of mitigating agrarian overpopulation, and indirect coercion of the state to resettle with elements of forced migration began to be applied. Within this second stage, with the beginning of complete collectivisation, along with the planned agricultural resettlement, the special resettlement of ‘Kurkuls’ and the clearing of the border strip from ‘politically dangerous’ elements are gaining momentum. With the beginning of the 1930s, previously planned resettlement by the Soviet authorities went into a completely different dimension and was characterised as mass deportations.

For a better understanding of the above-mentioned processes, it is worth dwelling on the terminology used in this article. A clear and stable conceptual apparatus for the outlined scientific problem has practically not yet been developed, so we have to define its key terms. ‘Self-resettlement’ can be characterised as the spontaneous resettlement of large groups of people to new territories in search of free land for cultivation and ensuring the existence of their families. Such actions become possible in the absence of the relevant regulatory framework or its improper non-implementation by the competent state bodies. By ‘forced migration’ we understand the policy of moving a significant number of people by the state using means of coercion. State coercion for such resettlement could be direct or indirect. By direct coercion we understand forced migration, or it is also called deportation. These were often frankly repressive or even punitive measures of the state’s influence on people. Indirect forced resettlement is voluntary forced migration, when the state exerted influence on the circumstances and factors of individual decision-making on resettlement and exactly in such a way that the state would like to see it. In fact, in such cases, administrative pressure was applied to express the will of the people.

14 Розовик О. Радянська програма переселення… С. 68.
Deportation or forced migration is one of the specific forms or varieties of political repression. The defining features are their administrative nature and targeting not at a specific person, but at a whole group of people who meet the criteria set by the state authorities. Decisions on deportation were made, as a rule, by the party and state leadership, at the initiative of the United State Political Administration and the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

Characterising the above-mentioned stages, we must emphasise that the establishment of Soviet power in Ukraine in the early 1920s did not bring the stability promised by the Bolsheviks to social and economic processes. During the first stage (1921-1925), both within the territory of Ukraine and to other regions, mass self-relocations took place, and resettlement measures were carried out by the state using indirect coercion. These were transfers of the agricultural population from the forest-steppe zone of Ukraine to the Steppe, as well as to the Volga region, Central Asia, beyond the Urals, to the North Caucasus and the Kuban. The massiveness and lack of control of this process prompted the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (CEC) in 1921 to adopt a resolution suspending mass immigration to the Asian part of Russia. This was explained by the need to clarify issues regarding the free land fund and complete preparatory work for the organisation of resettlement.

The self-relocations of this period were connected with the consequences of the policy of ‘war communism’, the famine of 1921-1923 and the aggravation of the land issue, since the Bolshevik redistribution of land did not solve the problem of the peasants’ lack of land. In many cases, the peasants, without waiting for the state to organise resettlement, left voluntarily. The research of archival documents leads to the conclusion that the resettlement of the first half of the 1920s in Ukraine was often spontaneous and combined both an internal republican direction and was oriented beyond the borders of the UkrSSR.

The solution to the acute problem of rural unemployment in the short-term perspective was seen in resettlement, initially within the borders of Ukraine, on the land of the Tavriya, Kherson, Katerynoslav and Zaporizhzhya provinces. For the implementation of such large-scale tasks, it was necessary to attract significant state funding. Therefore, according to the decision of the Council of People’s Commissars of the UkrSSR, in March 1921, an Emergency Resettlement Commission was established under the People’s Commissariat of Land Affairs of the UkrSSR. Its tasks were to resolve all issues related to the resettlement of peasants both within the borders of the UkrSSR and outside the borders of the republic. Corresponding commissions were also created at all gubernatorial and district authorities15.

These commissions began active work on the registration of landless peasants and the search for free plots for the resettlement of such families. However, already from the second half of 1921, these commissions had to reorient their activities in accordance with the situation. In connection with the drought and famine of 1921-1923, which covered Ukraine, the Volga region, the Kuban, and the North Caucasus, these commissions were also forced to deal with the resettlement of refugees from hungry regions, their employment, the allocation of land for them for settlement, and the establishment of proper production activities in newly created settlements and associations16.

16 Розовик О. Радянська програма переселення... С. 69.
Since 1921, the selection of a contingent of resettlers was entrusted to the district land departments of the territories whose agrarian population was subject to resettlement. When choosing the districts from which resettlers were to be sent in the first place, they had to be guided by the instructions of the People's Commissariat for Land Affairs of the UkrSSR. The order of districts was established according to the following principle: 1) from districts in which a significant number of landless and small-land peasants appeared as a result of land management; 2) from areas where there was a significant discrepancy between the surplus of agricultural workers and the demand for this labor force; 3) from areas in which the rationalisation of agriculture was impossible without prior unloading by resettlement.

It was assumed that all families subject to resettlement were to be united in resettlement societies. The composition of each such family had to include at least 5 people, provided that there were an average of 2.5 working family members. The family also had to have financial support, in particular, funds of at least 500 rubles or agricultural equipment.

This order of internal resettlement existed until October 1, 1925. The areas of eviction and the number of resettled people in this first period were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№</th>
<th>The name of the districts to which the resettlement was carried out</th>
<th>Moved</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Until 1924</td>
<td>During 1924/25 business year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Zaporizhzhia</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Zinoviev</td>
<td>1 015</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kryvyi Rih</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mariupol</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Melitopol</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1 227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mykolayiv</td>
<td>4 406</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Odesa</td>
<td>2 793</td>
<td>2 589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pavlograd</td>
<td>1 067</td>
<td>1 165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Pervomaisk</td>
<td>2 263</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>1 662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>That's all</strong></td>
<td><strong>12 149</strong></td>
<td><strong>8 391</strong></td>
<td><strong>20 530</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 Ibidem.
The key document that brought the resettlement issue to a new level was the resolution of the Central Committee of the Central Committee of October 30, 1922 ‘On the Implementation of the Land Code of the RSFSR’. This document formed the basis of the Land Code of the Russian Federation, approved by the resolution of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee of November 29, 1922. In these Codes of the RSFSR and UkrSSR, the term ‘resettlement’ was defined for the first time. It meant a change of place of residence by a land user when a plot of land was allocated to him in a special order in a new place, with the cessation of farming in the previous one. It was also declared that the resettlement was a voluntary matter, only in exceptional cases the provincial executive committees were given the right to announce forced resettlement. This was to be carried out at the request of the gubernia land departments, approved by the people’s commissar of the republic. Resettlement could be carried out only if national or local funds were allocated for it.

The Land Code of the UkrSSR entrusted the Ukrainian People’s Commissariat of Land Affairs with responsibility for internal resettlement. However, when resettling outside the UkrSSR, he had to coordinate his activities with the departments of the relevant union and autonomous republics. In addition, the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the UkrSSR was supposed to develop resettlement plans, manage and control their course, carry out measures to prepare colonisation funds. The adopted Land Codes in both the RSFSR and the UkrSSR were oriented, including, to the opening of mass planned resettlement, but could not take into account all aspects of resettlement problems.

Nevertheless, until 1924, this work did not have a clearly organised and systematic character. In addition, a statement was sent to the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the RSFSR about the closure of resettlement on its territory and about the futility of submitting petitions in this regard. Loans for resettlement were not granted. Farms abandoned by the emigrants were handed over to mutual aid committees or village councils, which gave them to poor peasants on the condition that they be protected from destruction and theft.

Analysing the activities of the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the UkrSSR, which relied on the practical organisation of resettlement, and local authorities in the districts where the resettlement was carried out, it can be understood that the work on this issue was not properly addressed. The program of registration of displaced persons and their resettlement was never developed, therefore it was practically impossible to control the implementation of resettlement measures by the People’s Commissariat. The policy of resettlement in this period was reduced to the selection of such peasant farms that had the necessary material means for settling in new places and a reserve of labor in the family. This policy of the state was also explained by the lack of funds and means for providing assistance to families during resettlement.

Until 1924, in the districts from which resettlement was carried out, there was no official in their land departments who would be responsible for organising the

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20 Земельный Кодекс УССР. Постановление ВУЦВК от 29 ноября 1922 г. URL: https://yurist-online.org/laws/codes/ex/zem1922/zemelnij_kodeks_usrr_1922.pdf
21 Ibidem.
resettlement of people. Often, orders of the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the UkrSSR were sent to those districts that did not really need to resettle their residents. In the archival documents of that period, there are no statistics of the resettlement case, there is no information about the study and consideration by the republican and union authorities of the issue of the economic effect of resettlement. And most importantly, there is no information about the situation of the displaced people, solving the problems of their relocation and settling in a new place. The fate of the people remained outside the attention of the ‘people’s’ government.

Since the main colonisation funds of the USSR were located on the territory of the RSFSR, the union government entrusted the development of a perspective resettlement and colonisation plan to the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the RSFSR. Over time, the powers of the People’s Commissariat of the RSFSR have only expanded. For example, from December 1, 1924, by decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR, he was given the right to allow resettlement in areas with free land, without the consent of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee23.

In continuation of the development of the resettlement policy, on October 17, 1924, the resolution of the Council of Labor and Defense ‘On the immediate tasks of colonisation and resettlement’ was issued, which for the first time defined the main task of the Soviet resettlement policy: “...the involvement of undeveloped lands in the economic cycle with the aim of increasing agricultural and industrial products of the country through rational use both from the point of view of national and local interests”, and the planned nature of resettlement was also announced24. Such resettlement was called agricultural. In the 1920s, it formally looked voluntary. The Soviet authorities made a clear internal political emphasis on planned mass resettlement.

One of the reasons for the state’s support of the resettlement policy was overpopulation and uncontrolled migration, which had already been recorded until the mid-1920s. For their planning and regulation of flows, it was necessary to reorganise the resettlement apparatus. On October 17, 1924, the Central Colonisation Committee was established at the Central Committee of the USSR, which now managed resettlement within the entire USSR25. Over time, it was reorganised into the All-Union Resettlement Committee under the Central Executive Committee of the USSR26. To coordinate the actions of the union republics, the All-Union Resettlement Committee included two representatives from these republics: one as a presidium member, the other as a committee member.

The powers of this Committee included general management of the resettlement policy of the USSR, approval of resettlement measures of the Union republics, development and adoption of the legal framework, determination of the contingent of resettlers, ‘exit’ areas and resettlement areas, coordination of annual plans for

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24 Ibid. С. 20.
25 Платунов Н.Н. Переселенческая политика Советского государства... С. 70.
26 Собрание узаконений и распоряжений рабочего и крестьянского правительства СССР. 1925. № 49. С. 371.
railway transportation, material support for resettlers, control over implementation of resettlement plans\textsuperscript{27}.

In its activities, the All-Union Resettlement Committee cooperated quite closely with the Council of people’s Commissars of the USSR, the All-Union People’s Commissars, the party leadership of the Union republics, regions and regions, regional and regional executive committees of the councils, the headquarters of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, and authorised representatives of the United State Political Directorate of the regions. Directly on the ground at the regional and regional councils, as the highest bodies of local executive power, the relevant Resettlement Committees worked as authorised regional representatives of the All-Union Resettlement Committee. The All-Ukrainian Resettlement Committee was also created at the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, and its Regulations were approved in October 1926\textsuperscript{28}. Following the instructions of the Kremlin Center, a department for resettlement was also created at the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the UkSSR\textsuperscript{29}.

Since 1925, a completely different stage (1925-1930) of immigration policy began. The resettlement movement took on forms managed by Soviet state bodies, the geography of the areas subject to resettlement expanded, and it was directed now mainly outside the borders of Ukraine. At the end of the 1920s, the first steps towards mass forced resettlement/deportation were initiated in the resettlement policy of the Soviet government.

Based on statistics, as of the mid-1920s, 49 million 215 thousand people lived in the RSFSR. Overpopulation in the amount of 5 million 239 thousand people (9.5\%) was calculated here. In the UkSSR, about 4 million 200 thousand people (about 22\%) were considered ‘superfluous’ out of a population of 23 million 758 thousand. BSSR with a total population of 4 million 202 thousand people at that time was considered overpopulated by 614 thousand people (about 15\%)\textsuperscript{30}. Therefore, at the XIV conference of the RCP(b), which took place in Moscow in April 1925, the gradual solution to the issue of the surplus rural population was named among the most important tasks. The result of the preparatory work on the opening of planned mass resettlement was the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Commission and the Council of people’s Commissars of the RSFSR ‘On the Opening of Planned Resettlement to the Volga Region, Siberia and the Far East’ dated July 6, 1925\textsuperscript{31}. Later, resettlement to the North Caucasus and the Urals was opened. Since these were the territories of the RSFSR, now at the all-Union level the need to study the areas of emigrants’ exit was considered, and emigrant affairs projects were developed.

At the meeting of July 15, 1925, the Presidium of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee decided to develop a number of resettlement issues that were of national importance and required an urgent solution\textsuperscript{32}. The Ukrainian Council of People’s Commissars submitted a memorandum to the presidium of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee on the plan of resettlement outside of Ukraine on the
union collective funds\textsuperscript{33}. The document stated that the colonisation fund of the Ukrainian SSR could accommodate only 72,000 yards at that time, which, according to the plan of the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the UkrSSR, were supposed to be resettled in the next three to four years. However, this did not solve the problem of agrarian overpopulation, since the plan for the reconstruction of Ukraine’s agriculture estimated the growth of the population of only the forest-steppe zone of Ukraine for the next 7 years in the amount of 1 million 865 thousand souls or 37 thousand yards\textsuperscript{34}.

The problem of agrarian overpopulation of the republic acquired a permanent character and required a systematic solution. On October 6, 1925, at the meeting of the Presidium of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee of the UkrSSR, the plan of the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the UkrSSR to resettle Ukrainian peasants outside the republic, on the Union Colonisation Funds, was brought up for discussion. According to the results of the meeting, it was decided to ask the union government to approve the resettlement plan and to implement it, to allocate about 318,000 rubles from the union funds, as well as to help Ukrainian peasants to move freely to the union funds\textsuperscript{35}. We should immediately note that the requested amount of funds for the implementation of such a project was quite modest. Already on October 10, the resettlement plan of Ukrainian peasants for the 1925/26 economic year to the union collective funds with the estimate was sent to the All-Union Resettlement Committee at the Central Executive Committee of the USSR\textsuperscript{36}.

The study of the experience of resettlement on collective funds in previous years and the contingent and number of resettlers showed that poor households took 60%, middle-income households – 30%, and wealthy households – 10% of the total number\textsuperscript{37}. Therefore, already at the beginning of this stage in the implementation of the resettlement policy, the authorities had to abandon such a component as the availability of sufficient material resources for the families subject to resettlement. For this purpose, on July 30, 1926, the presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR adopted a resolution that indicated the need to involve the poor categories of the rural population in resettlement\textsuperscript{38}.

By the same resolution of the Central Committee of the USSR, the plan of resettlement measures for the nearest period was made public and the sequence of regions to be resettled was established. These were the regions of the Volga region, the Ural, Kazakhstan, Bashkiria, the North Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia, the Far East, and the Northern Crimea. In five years (1926-1930), 675,000 people or 120,000 peasant households were planned to be resettled here from Ukraine\textsuperscript{39}. However, at this meeting, the request of the presidium of the Ukrainian SSR ‘On approval of the plan for the resettlement of the Ukrainian population outside the borders of the SSR and on the provision of funds from all-Union funds’ was rejected. Instead, the All-Union Resettlement Committee at the Central Committee of the Union of the SSR was

\textsuperscript{33} CSAHA&GU. Fund 1. List 2. File 2630. P. 137.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{35} CSAHA&GU. Fund 1. List 2. File 2921. P. 42.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid. P. 50.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. P. 20.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid. P. 23.
offered to take into account the application of the UkrSSR when developing a resettlement plan for the next economic year\textsuperscript{40}.

However, the leadership of the Ukrainian SSR did not give up and looked for ways to solve the problem of increasing rural unemployment. On August 26, 1926, at the meeting of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, it was stated that for the next economic year, for the first time after the revolution, a large-scale plan for resettlement outside Ukraine was developed. It was the result of the desire of landless Ukrainian peasants to be resettled on union collective farms. The government also suggested that the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the UkrSSR take all necessary measures to directly organise further resettlement outside the republic, ensuring that Ukraine, first of all, has the appropriate degree of participation in the use of union funds and the organisation of resettlement\textsuperscript{41}.

The All-Union Resettlement Committee also launched significant activities for the organisation of resettlement work. He investigated the entire territory of the USSR, identified sparsely populated and densely populated regions, clarified their natural and climatic conditions, the availability of free land and the possibility and necessity of their use. The regions of emigrants’ departure and their settlement, the procedure for financing resettlement activities, etc., were also determined\textsuperscript{42}. On the part of the USSR government, the All-Union Resettlement Committee was instructed in the coming years to primarily settle the sparsely populated regions of the Far East, Central Asia, Siberia, and Karelia.

Strict control was established by the state over the implementation of resettlement measures. The population was divided into planned and unplanned immigrants, which simplified the work to some extent. Resettled people received a special ticket – a permit to travel to the place of settlement. There they were provided with housing, first financial assistance in the form of credits and loans. More often than not, resettlers, having received a credit or loan from the state, were unable to pay it on time. The reason was the long adaptation to the new place of residence, disorderly life, failure of crops and many other factors that had a negative impact on settling in the new place. The Union Council of People’s Commissars allocated significant funds for the settlement of land-rich areas. However, these funds often did not reach specific immigrants. The authorities of the resettlement places were not always ready to accept new citizens, there were significant problems with housing for the displaced: it was either not there at all, or it was unsuitable for living. Therefore, many of the emigrants returned to their former place of residence. Such life circumstances pushed people to think about moving to industrial cities and large constructions\textsuperscript{43}.

In 1926, the government of the Ukrainian SSR for the first time provided material assistance to immigrants from the state budget in the form of a long-term loan, although the amount of this assistance met the needs of only a quarter of the immigrants. The Ukrainian government initiated a further increase in material assistance to displaced persons, issuing loans exclusively in cash. During the resettlement, they sometimes tried to provide the resettled with medical and

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\textsuperscript{40} CSAHA&GU. Fund 1. List 2. File 2921. P. 73.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid. P. 78.


\textsuperscript{43} RSAE. Fund 5675. List 1. File 36. P. 35.
veterinary care and the organisation of cultural services. However, the government of the USSR clearly understood that resettlement only partially and in the short term solves the problem of agrarian overpopulation in the regions of the republic. That is why the question was raised about the need to use the colonisation opportunities of the South of Ukraine. They tried to convey this opinion to the Soviet party bosses in the Kremlin. All available opportunities were used for this purpose.

Thus, in January 1927, to implement the resolution of the All-Union Resettlement Committee on the provision of 10-year resettlement plans of the republics, the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the UkrSSR was submitted, approved by the Ukrainian Soviet People’s Committee, ‘Perspective 10-Year Plan (1926-1935) of Resettlement from Ukraine to Uninhabited and sparsely populated regions of the USSR’. According to this document, the number of ‘excess’ population in Ukraine, which was foreseen by the prospective plan for resettlement outside the republic, taking into account its growth over the next 10 years, was about 9 million 458 thousand people or 1 million 819 thousand households. In this plan, it was noted that the Ukrainian leadership also saw the solution to the issue of agrarian overpopulation of the republic in the intensification of its agriculture, the development of local industry and exports, handicrafts, reclamation of undeveloped lands, finally, resettlement to the south of Ukraine and easing the conditions for the use of hired labor in agriculture, short-term land lease, etc. And only after the implementation of these measures, the surplus of the rural population, which will not be involved in these processes, could make up the contingent of future immigrants outside the republic. However, this was to be carried out under the condition of the support of the Union leadership of republican programs and state aid to poor peasant farms.

It was a time that still somewhat allowed the Ukrainian republican leadership to give its analysis and assessment of the situation in the agricultural sector and to openly express its proposals for solving the issue of the ‘surplus’ of the agricultural population. The possibility of the development of production forces in the agricultural sector of Ukraine was also seen in the steady and systematic growth of the labor productivity of both the producer himself and the land cultivated by him. However, the intensive economy of densely populated districts, the rational use of the economic opportunities of the South of Ukraine, according to the Ukrainian republican leadership, could have the proper effect under the conditions of the development of market relations.

The increase in the productivity of agricultural labor, as seen in the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the UkrSSR, could be carried out in two ways: by increasing agricultural capital investments and by reducing non-production costs for the production of agricultural products. In particular, the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR developed a 7-year plan to combat drought in the South of Ukraine and increase agricultural productivity there. In 1925, the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR also developed and submitted for consideration by the Union bodies ‘Perspective Plan for Agriculture of the Forest-

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46 Ibid. P. 3.
Steppe and Polissia of Ukraine’. At the 3rd session of the Central Executive Committee, the materials for the report of the head of the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the UkrSSR ‘Plan of measures to combat drought’ were considered. However, for the Kremlin leadership, it was easier and cheaper to plan the ‘voluntary’ resettlement of the Ukrainian population to the Far East and the taiga, under the guise of a plan to develop previously uninhabited areas of Siberia. The real goal lay in a slightly different desire: to get rid of the masses of Ukrainians who were ‘inconvenient’ for the Soviet authorities as soon as possible, to disperse them to other regions of the USSR, in fact, as later history showed, to destroy them.

As we can see, the Ukrainian republican leadership emphasised the need to clarify the specifics of agricultural regions, to improve agrarian policy, which would allow avoiding agricultural unemployment of significant masses of the population in the future. To solve the question of the profitability of agricultural areas of the steppe zone of Ukraine, the opinion of Ukrainian scientists was involved. As Professor K. Kondratiev believed, the possibility of developing and reorganising the economy of this zone could contribute to solving general issues of the economic policy of the USSR. First of all, it would help in solving the problems of finding profitable foreign markets, establishing relations with them and winning strong positions for their products there.

However, most of these measures were of a long-term nature. Therefore, the Soviet authorities considered the resettlement of peasants as a necessary condition for faster overcoming of other economic problems. The events of March 4-8, 1927, when the First All-Russian Meeting of Immigration Workers took place in Moscow, were an eloquent testimony to this. The settlement of the Far East (in particular, Sakhalin), Siberia, and the Karelo-Murman region with the simultaneous deployment of railway and industrial construction in these areas was based on it. The Kremlin was interested in the settlement of underdeveloped territories, their economic growth and industrial development. The key to the implementation of the ‘gigantomania’ plans was seen in the large-scale use of cheap labor, primarily the Ukrainian population.

Since then, the Soviet authorities have attempted to use indirect coercion for resettlement in combination with elements of repressive and punitive measures. Thus, at the meeting of the Council of the People’s Commissars of the USSR on June 28, 1927, a report was heard ‘On the task of resettlement and its organisational foundations for the creation of a perspective plan and on the procedure for financing resettlement measures’. At the same time, the proposal of the head of the Central Executive Committee G. Petrovskyi that resettlement should first of all be carried out from the border strip was also accepted. This was actually the first signal for the deployment of forced resettlement from the national regions, initiated, as we can see, by the regions themselves. As the entire subsequent history of the Soviet era shows, such a ‘cunning policy’ was used quite often, especially in the relations of the RSFSR with the national republics.

Even earlier, on May 24, 1927, a commission was created under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chairman of the State Planning of the USSR, E. Quiring, by a joint

resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of the People’s Commissars of the USSR ’On the task of resettlement, its organisation, the basis of creating a perspective plan and the procedure for financing resettlement measures’\textsuperscript{50}. However, it soon became apparent that the project itself was unsustainable, which was supposed to resettle 5 million people over 10 years, out of 13.5 million ‘surplus’ agricultural population at that time. According to the republics, it would look like this:

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Surplus population</th>
<th>Resettlement plans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>in 5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>6,9</td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSRR</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>0,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UkrSSR</td>
<td>5,4</td>
<td>0,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>That’s all</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,5</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the All-Union Resettlement Plan, the organisation of the emigration of displaced persons, their movement on the territories of the Union Republics, was entrusted to the Republican People’s Commissariat of Land Affairs. All resettlement measures in the areas of settlement were also carried out by the People’s Commissariats of the respective Union Republics through their local land bodies. Resettlement measures in the uninhabited areas of the Far East, Siberia and the northern part of the Ural region were carried out by special resettlement bodies of the People’s Commissariat of Land Affairs of the RSFSR\textsuperscript{52}.

Practically at the same time, such a type of forced migration as ‘border clearing’ began to be practiced for the first time. Researchers point to the diverse content of the very concept of ‘border’ and ‘border strip’ at that time. In 1923, border strips of various types, regimes and, accordingly, widths (500 and 800 m, 7.5, 16 and 22 km) were legalised. From the point of view of deportation policy, the most relevant is the last one – a 22-kilometer strip, from where, in fact, deportations of the population were carried out in the form of a ‘border sweep’\textsuperscript{53}. On the basis of the resolutions of the Labor and Defense Council, the issuance of resettlement orders was primarily to be distributed among the districts of the border strip. Ukraine was also included in such regions.

The first resolutions on the resettlement of the ‘socially dangerous element’ on the western border of the USSR, from the border regions of the Ukrainian SSR and the

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid. P. 13.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid. P. 15.
\textsuperscript{53} Полян П. Не по своей воле... История и география принудительных миграций в СССР. Москва: ОГИ-Мемориал, 2001. С. 47.
BSSR, were adopted, as we have already emphasised, not by the Union governments, but by the republican governments. In April 1929, the All-Union Resettlement Committee addressed the Soviet People's Committee of the Ukrainian SSR with the question of the resettlement of the socially dangerous population from the border areas\(^5\). The goal was the desire of the central bodies of the Soviet government in Moscow to encourage the republican leadership to ‘improve’ the economic conditions of the border strip. In this regard, the Council of the People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR had to organise and carry out resettlement from this strip.

In particular, the resolution of the Council of the People's Commissars of the UkrSSR dated November 13, 1929 ‘On the resettlement of a socially dangerous element from the border districts of the UkrSSR'\(^5\) emphasised the desire of the Soviet authorities to “rapidly improve the economic conditions of the border strip of the UkrSSR and facilitate the implementation of reconstruction measures in it”. For this purpose, citizens who were recognised as ‘socially dangerous’ for their further stay in the 22-kilometer strip were ‘voluntarily’ included in the resettlement contingents. According to the resolution of the Council of the People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, separate districts of Korosten, Volyn, Shepetivka, Proskuriv, Kamianets-Podilsk, Mogilyov-Podilsk, Tulchyn and Odesa districts, as well as the Autonomous Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, were assigned to this zone.

The execution of these tasks was entrusted to the National Committee of the Ukrainian SSR, which immediately created a corresponding commission. It included representatives from the People's Commissariat for Land Affairs of the UkrSSR, the United State Political Directory and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Such commissions were secretly created at the district and district land departments of the districts that were part of the border strip. On the ground, such commissions had to include a representative of the local United State Political Directory, the land and administrative departments of the district executive committee. They were supposed to carry out a preliminary study of the issue of resettlement of ‘socially dangerous elements’. However, not a single document was written that would determine the criteria and grounds for classifying people as ‘socially dangerous elements’. The final decision on the submission of these local commissions was made by the commission of the People's Commissariat for Land Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR.

These local commissions formed a contingent, determined the sequence and terms of eviction of socially dangerous persons. These included those suspected of robberies, banditry, horse theft, theft, arson, fraud, hooliganism, as well as persons who had connections with kulaks, families of administrative exiles for criminal offences, and persons who returned from administrative exile. Another category consisted of persons serving sentences for counter-revolutionary crimes; ‘former people’ (landlords, policemen, gendarmes); persons who had relatives abroad; accused of being uncharitable; defectors remaining in the border strip; former ‘white’ officers; members of political gangs and counter-revolutionary organisations, etc\(^5\).

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\(^5\) Ibid. P. 42.

The task of this commission was prescribed in the same resolution. They consisted in the use of direct coercion for resettlement, in particular, the use of measures to ‘incentivise’ these citizens to apply for resettlement, including tax pressure and all other possible actions. In fact, the state began to apply coercion to voluntary and forced migration. The state put pressure on the circumstances and factors of individual decision-making in exactly the way it wanted to see it. Therefore, the annual orders for planned resettlement had to necessarily include a contingent of citizens recognised as ‘socially dangerous’. In order to control this process, special reports on the work done by the commission of the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the UkrSSR were submitted twice a year to the Council of the People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, which reported to the Kremlin on the state of affairs in this area of Soviet state policy.

Preparatory work on the organisation of the departure of the specified resettlers of the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR began almost immediately with the understanding that these persons had to show a ‘desire’ to resettle voluntarily. However, problems began to arise almost immediately. They were connected with the fact that the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the UkrSSR did not have appropriate clarifications from the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the USSR regarding the practical solution to the preparation of contingents of immigrants and their transfer to the colonisation funds designated for them. The instructions received from the higher Union authorities did not contain a specific plan for the number of displaced persons and the land plots allocated for them. There were also no clear instructions regarding the principles of settling resettled people on union collective funds, setting up new settlements or sub-settlements in already existing ones, organising new collective farms for them or settling them in existing ones. The issue of material support for the migrants, whose contingent consisted mainly of poor families, was also acute. They needed help from the state for logistics and accommodation in the harsh conditions of the Siberian taiga.

The property that remained after such immigrants could be bought by local collective farms or poor peasants at the expense of a loan provided by Ukrsilbank. Such actions on the part of the state deliberately cut off the opportunity for these displaced persons to return home. The organisation of the arrangement of such forced migrants in a new place, providing them with loans was to be taken care of by the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, and the People’s Committee of Finances of the Ukrainian SSR was to issue loans for these purposes. However, the constant lack of funds often left the displaced people alone in moving and settling in a new place.

It is worth emphasising that the migrants from the Ukrainian border strip were sent exclusively to the collective funds in the Siberian taiga. The authorities ‘worried’ about such a contingent of immigrants in advance. By a secret resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR, dated October 4, 1929, the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs RSFSR was proposed to carry out all necessary measures to organise the resettlement of socially ‘dangerous’ citizens from the western border strip of the USSR to Siberia. In order to hide the real purpose of

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57 Ibid. C. 96.
resettlement, the designated contingent was to be resettled on a common basis with planned resettlers, but at the settlement sites in Siberia, everything had to be done for the fastest and reliable ‘acclimatisation’ of such resettlers in a new place\textsuperscript{59}. The confirmation of this is the resolution superimposed on the Letter of the People’s Commissariat of Lands of the RSFSR to the head of the Siberian District Resettlement Administration on the organisation of the resettlement of a ‘socially dangerous element’ from the border areas of the country to Siberia. The resolution convincingly recommended the Siberian District Resettlement Administration together with the United State Political Directory to determine Tomsk, Achinsk and Krasnoyarsk districts as the settlement areas of such a special contingent. Such migrants were proposed to be placed on a special register and denied the opportunity to return to their previous place of residence. For this, along with receiving a loan, this category of immigrants had to receive a period of residence\textsuperscript{60}.

However, soon the Resettlement Department of the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the RSFSR had to send an additional explanation to the leadership of the Siberian Police Service regarding the reception of resettled people from the western border areas. The Russian People’s Commissariat understood two categories of immigrants by ‘socially dangerous elements’. The first category included persons who were deported by judicial authorities and the United State Political Directory authorities to a specific address (Narym, Solovki), without granting them any rights and benefits that were established for planned immigrants. The second category included ‘socially dangerous’ elements of the border strip who resettled ‘voluntarily’. They were mostly poor or poor peasants. Their ‘social danger’ consisted only in the fact that they lived in the border zone and had relatives abroad. The main goal of the resettlement of such categories of people was the effort to send them away from the border and imprison them in such places where ‘...the social danger of these displaced persons... will come to nothing’\textsuperscript{61}.

An interesting solution to the question of the fate of border lands vacated in the course of these sweeps. One thing was clear that no one would be allowed to settle there. The solution was found at the end of the 1920s and consisted in the organisation along the borders of the USSR of the so-called ‘Red Army collective farms’, which were formed from demobilised Red Army soldiers and their family members. These collective farms were a symbolic form of manifestation of ‘Soviet xenophobia’\textsuperscript{62}.

The activity of the higher authorities of the RSFSR in the matter of cleaning the western border strip from ‘politically unsavoury elements’ continued in the following years. In particular, by the resolution of the People’s Commissariat of the USSR dated August 6, 1930, all management of special colonisation from the territory of Ukraine was transferred to the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the RSFSR\textsuperscript{63}. In the ‘Service Memo’ of the All-Union Resettlement Administration, addressed under the seal ‘secretly’ to the People’s Committees of the RSFSR and the UkrSSR on the issue of resettlement of ‘socially dangerous elements’ from the border strip of the UkrSSR in

\textsuperscript{59} Восточный вектор переселенческой политики в СССР... С. 88.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid. С. 89.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid. С. 90.
\textsuperscript{62} Полян П. Не по своей воле... С. 54.
\textsuperscript{63} RSAE. Fund 5675. List 1. File 23-а. P. 60.
the 1930/31 economic year, it was emphasised that this proposal came precisely from the Ukrainian government\textsuperscript{64}. The direction of such resettlement of Ukrainians in Moscow was determined only in the regions of the Siberian taiga. For this purpose, the special sector for resettlement under the People’s Commissariat for Land Affairs of the RSFSR instructed the Siberian District Resettlement Administration to map out the areas of resettlement of special resettlement contingents from the UkrSSR and determine the cost estimate for housing the first thousand of such resettlement in the 1930/31 economic year.

Thus, the voluntary resettlement of the peasantry ceased to exist in the late 1920s. During the period of mass collectivisation, resettlement bodies became a part of the repressive system. On the basis of the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (AUCPB) ‘On measures to eliminate kulak farms in areas of complete collectivisation’ dated January 30, 1930, and a joint resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR ‘On measures to strengthen socialist agriculture in areas of complete collectivisation and the fight against kulakism’ from February 1, 1930, resettlement authorities began to involve ‘Kurkul families’ in forced evictions\textsuperscript{65}. Evictions of families of wealthy Ukrainian peasants turned into punitive measures by the United State Political Directory. These families were deprived of all rights and left to fend for themselves. The outlined measures did not fit into the term ‘resettlement’ in any way, they cannot be qualified as ‘voluntary change of residence’, although elements of planning still remained here, as economic factors continued to dominate political ones for some time.

CONCLUSIONS
The migration of Ukrainian peasants in the 1920s to colonisation funds and sparsely populated areas was a reaction to the decline in their financial situation. It was based on socio-economic and demographic factors, as well as the poor socio-economic policy of the Soviet government. In the resettlement of the 1920s two stages can be clearly traced, characterised by the level of state intervention in this process. For the first half of the 1920s, self-resettlement was more characteristic, as well as the efforts of the Soviet state authorities to give this process organisation and control. In the middle and second half of the 1920s the Soviet authorities made attempts to direct the resettlement movement in the direction of the state program of measures, to clearly control the resettlement areas, based on economic expediency. However, the declaration of material support for the displaced people did not receive adequate funding.

At the end of the 1920s there was severe state intervention in migration processes. These measures of the Soviet government can be characterised not as help from the state in solving socio-economic problems, but as an obstacle to the voluntary departure of peasants and the organisation of forced resettlement of ‘inconvenient’ elements, especially from the western border strip. Therefore, we can state with confidence that the resettlement policy of the Soviet government in the 1920s was

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid. P. 58. Сопу.

the first step towards the beginning of mass deportations. Voluntary and forced resettlement of Ukrainians, which took place in the first decade of Soviet power in Ukraine, became test steps to clarify the reaction of society to the openly anti-Ukrainian policy of the Bolsheviks.

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