DNIPRO-BUH ESTUARY COAST IN CONTEXT OF EASTERN CAMPAIGNS OF PRINCE SVIATOSLAV (964-972)

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The debatable aspects of the eastern policy of Kyivan Rus during the reign of Prince Sviatoslav (964-972) are studied in the paper. Particular attention is paid to the campaigns of Rus troops against the Khazar Khaganate. The quantity of Sviatoslav’s eastern campaigns, the complement of their participants, the influence of Byzantine diplomacy on their organization, evidence of sources on the geography of military operations, and a role played by the Dnipro-Buh estuary as a strategic point on the Rus’ waterway to the Caspian Sea are considered.

Analysis of written sources and the international context of the eastern policy of Prince Sviatoslav of Kyiv makes it possible to state that the military operations of Rus troops against Khazaria can be combined into two campaigns that are of 965 and 968-969. The route of those campaigns passed along the ancient waterway, which connected the Middle Dnipro region with the Caspian Sea. Waypoints of that route can be considered being the Dnipro trade route, the Black and Azov Seas, the Don and Volga rivers. An important place on this route was taken by the Dnipro-Buh estuary and its coast, in particular the island of St. Epheria (Berezan) and the Biloberezzhia. It was there that Sviatoslav’s troops made a stop for rest and re-equipment of ships for seafaring. Probably, in 965, Sviatoslav’s allies were “a large group of Turks.” The latter could be recognized as a combined contingent of Oghuz and Pechenegs or detachments of one of those tribes. The campaign of 965 could enjoy the support of Byzantium, which during the 10th century considered Khazaria its competitor in the struggle for influence in the region.

Keywords: Dnipro-Buh estuary, Kyivan Rus, Khazaria, Oghuz, Pechenegs

The coast of the Dnipro-Buh estuary for centuries remained a contact zone between the polities of the Northern Black Sea region and those located in Asia Minor, the Balkans, and other regions. The political, economic, and cultural relationship between these regions can be traced back to the 2nd millennium BCE, and more clearly to the time of the Great Greek Colonization (7th – 5th centuries BCE). This trend continued in the Middle Ages as well, having reached its peak in the days of Kyivan Rus. The reign of Prince Sviatoslav of Kyiv (964-972) was the time of Rus’ foreign policy intensification. Situation in the studied region is no exception and requires further specification.

The Dnipro-Buh estuary was an important section of the international path ‘from the Varangians to the Greeks.’ The most detailed descriptions of the latter are preserved in the ‘Tale of Bygone Years’ (‘Povist Mynulykh Lit’) and the works of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus. The latter source pays special attention to the Dnipro and Black Sea route sections. In the days of Sviatoslav, this route was effectively used by the Rus’ people in both trade and military affairs.

The key events of the short independent reign of Prince Sviatoslav are considered being campaigns against neighbors. The eastern Rus campaigns of that time are often geographically connected with the Volga basin. In a number of research works (B.A. Rybakov, M.I. Artamonov, O.V. Hadlo, A.M. Sakharov) Sviatoslav’s eastern policy was analyzed as one major military event that began in the lands of the Viatychi, included the lands of the Volga region from Volga Bulgaria to Khazaria and ended with the return of the prince’s forces over the North Caucasus, Taman, and the Don region to Kyiv.3

Evidence from sources (‘Tale of Bygone Years’, Ibn Hawqal) does not allow us to assert with certainty the possibility of a single major military campaign in the east. The ‘Tale of Bygone Years’ dates back the campaign to 965 and limits its geography to Sarkel (White Tower) and the Northern Caucasus4. According to Ibn Hawqal, the Rus’ operated in 968-969 in Volga Bulgaria and Khazaria, attacking the Volga region5.

Differences in geography and chronology of events, described in the above-mentioned sources, allow us to say that we are talking about two different campaigns (see the works of A.P. Novoseltsev, T.M. Kalinina)6. Details of the Rus’ route in the 60s of the 10th century are not given in the sources.

To resolve the issue of the route of Sviatoslav’s eastern campaigns, we should have analyzed the sources describing the previous actions of the Rus in the Caspian region. Arab geographers Ibn Khordadbeh and Ibn al-Faqih describe the trading activity of the Rus here as far back as in the 9th century. Ibn Khordadbeh’s evidence states that the Rus’ entered the Caspian Sea and from there the Arab Caliphate via the Don (“Tanis, the river of the Slavs”) and the Volga (Atil)7. According to Ibn al-Faqih, the Rus entered the “river of the Slavs” along the following route: the territory of Byzantium – Samkarsh (possibly Tamantarkhan) – the sea or the lands of the Slavs. Along the “River of Slavs” Rus go to the Volga and the Caspian Sea8. Thus, the Arab geographers of the 9th – early 10th century recorded the route of the Rus’ entry Khazaria from the Black and Azov Seas. An important role ren this route was played by the portage from the Don to the Volga, near which the Khazar fortress Sarkel existed since the 830s, which was one of the targets of Sviatoslav’s campaign9.

Al-Masudi (mid-10th century) left a detailed description of the Rus’ campaign in the Caspian Sea region, which took place between 913 and 917. According to this author,
the starting point of the Rus' route was the Black Sea (Bahr Buntus), from where they moved along the rivers to the Caspian Sea in agreement with the Khazar Khagan. The campaign described by al-Masudi ended in failure for the Rus, and until the 940s, they did not organize military operations in the Caspian Sea region. The campaign of "H-l-g-w, ruler of Rusia" against the Khazar Khaganate in the Kerch Strait region is mentioned in the 'Cambridge Document' (an anonymous letter of a Hebrew from Constantinople). A possible consequence of that action, according to N. Golb and O. Pritsak, was the Rus-Khazar agreement and the raid of Prince Igor against Constantinople (941). During the 9th – 10th centuries, relations between Khazaria and Byzantium repeatedly experienced periods of confrontation, and the position of Kyiv princes could have affected the results of that struggle.

There is no clear evidence from written sources about the movements of Rus’ trade and military contingents along the entire Volga River from the upper reaches to the Caspian Sea. This fact allows suggesting that in Sviatoslav’s time the best route by which his troops could get to Khazaria was over the Black Sea.

Given the above, we can offer another variant of the route of the Rus’ campaigns against the Khazars in the days of Sviatoslav. The starting point could be Kyiv, around which Rus’ armed forces gathered together. The military forces could be mobilized according to the scheme given by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus (Chapter 9 of the treatise 'De Administrando Imperio'). In this case, in the spring of 965, Sviatoslav’s troops began their movement along the Dnieper trade route. An important stop was made on the shores of the Dnieper-Buh estuary, where on the island of St. Ephoria (Berezan) and the Biloberezhzhia, Rus’ military contingents re-equipped their own ships for seafaring.

Leaving the Dnieper-Buh estuary, Rus’ troops moved along the Crimean coast until they reached the Kerch Strait. There Sviatoslav’s forces inflicted a defeat on Khazars for the first time, seizing Tamantarkhan, which the Rus could later use as a base for conducting a military campaign. Then, moving along a path known since the time of the campaigns at the turn of the 9th and 10th centuries, the Rus crossed the Sea of Azov and, moving up the Don, took over Sarkel (White Tower). Under its walls, they defeated the Khazars army of the Khagan. After that, Sviatoslav’s troops defeated the Alans (Jász) and Adyghe (Kasogs), after which the main Rus forces returned to Kyiv.

The campaign of 965 on Khazaria allowed Sviatoslav to gain strongholds (Tamantarkhan/Tmutarakan and Sarkel/White Tower) on the ancient route of the Rus to the Caspian Sea. The campaign itself can be analyzed in the context of Rus’ political cooperation with Byzantium, which was based on the agreement of 944. Military operations of Sviatoslav’s detachments in that campaign could look like a series of landing operations conducted with the support of squadron ships, as was done earlier during the campaigns in the Caspian Sea region at the turn of the 9th – 10th centuries and in 945, and how it would often happen during the wars in the Balkans in 967-971.

Scholars often point to the coincidence of the 965 campaign with the attack on Khazaria by “a large group of Turks,” as mentioned in the Arab chronicles of Ibn

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12 Ibid. С. 132-133.
13 Константин Багрянородный. Об управлении империи... С. 44-47.
Miskawayh and Ibn al-Thir\textsuperscript{14}. The attack of the Turks and their seizure of Khazar territories forced the Khazars to ask for help in Khwarazm. The Khwarazmians helped the Khazars, but the latter were forced to convert to Islam.

The opinion was expressed that the “Turks” could act in alliance and synchronously with Sviatoslav’s troops. Ibn Miskawayh and Ibn al-Thir, in the passage about the attack of the Turks, do not inform about their belonging to a particular tribe. T.M. Kalinina believed that those “Turks” could be the Oghuz or Pechenegs. “Turks” more often are identified as Oghuz (S.P. Tolstov, M.I. Artamonov, I.H. Konovalov), who occupied the steppes between Khazaria and Khwarazm\textsuperscript{15}. The attacks of the Turks on the territories of the Khazars in the Lower Volga region are mentioned by Arab geographers (for example, al-Masudi) also in connection with earlier events of the first half of the 10\textsuperscript{th} century\textsuperscript{16}. According to Arab sources, the invasion of the “Turks” in Khazaria took place in 354 AH (Anno Hegirae), which corresponds to the time from January 7 to December 27, 965, according to the Christian calendar. Al-Masudi tells that the Oghuz usually attacked in the winter when the Khazar rivers were frozen\textsuperscript{17}. Thus, the Oghuz invasion could not take place simultaneously with Sviatoslav’s campaign, as Rus troops were moving by water.

The Oghuz attack on Khazaria could take place in the winter of 964-965. Then the official conversion of the Khazars to Islam following Khwarazmian requirements took place in late winter or early March of 965. In this case, Sviatoslav attacked the Khazar Khaganate, weakened by the previous invasion. Nikephoros II Phokas (963-969) ruled in Byzantium at that time. He paid great attention to the confrontation with the Islamic states, in particular, proposed to consider as martyrs all those killed in the wars with Muslim states\textsuperscript{18} and he could have a negative attitude to the Islamization of the Khaganate as well. Byzantine-Khazar relations had long been experiencing bad times. Sviatoslav’s troops could count on Byzantine support, and the seizure of Tamantarkhan by the Rus disabled the Khazars to attack Byzantine territories in the Crimea.

But the sources allow us to date the attack of the Oghuz back to the winter of 965-966. In this case, their success can be explained by the defeat that Sviatoslav inflicted on the Khazar army led by the Khagan during the previous warm season.

T.M. Kalinina and B. Zhivkov also expressed the opinion that “a large group of Turks” in the works of Ibn Miskawayh and Ibn al-Thir could mean the Pechenegs\textsuperscript{19}. To some


\textsuperscript{16} Минарский В.Ф. История Ширвана и Дербента X-XI вв. С. 198.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibidem.


extent, this point of view is proved by the fact that the latter, well known to Arab geographers (al-Istakhri, Ibn Hawqal, al-Masudi), are not mentioned on the pages of historical works of the above-mentioned authors. This fact may explain their identification in Ibn Miskawayh and Ibn al-Athir under the common name “a large group of Turks.”

Sources tell us that the Pechenegs, who controlled the steppes of the Northern Black Sea region, took an active part in international conflicts and had regular political contacts with Khazaria, Byzantium, and Rus. An extended version of the letter of the Khazar Khagan Joseph, written about 957-961, mentions the B-ts-ra people, occupying the steppes to the west of Khazaria at the river V-h-z and recognizes the supremacy of its rulers. P.K. Kokovtsov, the researcher of the document, based on the point of view of A.Ya. Garkavi and F.F. Westberg, proposed to identify B-ts-ra as the Pechenegs, and the river V-h-z as the Dnipro. Such an identification seems quite appropriate, taking into account how the Pechenegs named themselves. That was ‘bečenek’.

The political influence of the Khazars on the Pechenegs, mentioned by Khagan Joseph, in the middle of the 10th century, could exist, but be limited. It could be reflected in the recognition of the political authority of the Khazar Khagan as the bearer of the supreme political power in the steppe zone. In this case, the Khazar-Pecheneg relations might resemble the ties of Byzantine rulers with certain polities in the Balkans and the Caucasus, which received orders (keleus) from Constantinople. A similar situation could be observed in the Abbasid Caliphate, when local rulers-emirs from the Samanid, Tulunid, Aglabid, and other dynasties recognized the formal authority of the caliphs of Baghdad, which was reflected in the reading of the Khudbah during Friday prayers and, in some cases, the payment of symbolic tributes. Al-Istakhri tells about the similar situation in Khazaria’s relations with the neighboring Turks tribes and the “neighboring Kafir peoples.” Such a formal recognition of supremacy did not prevent the ‘subordinate’ polities from fighting against their own ‘suzerains.’

Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, paying considerable attention to Byzantine-Pecheneg relations, in his treatise ‘De Administrando Imperio’ stated that the Pechenegs could be both a threat to the territories of Byzantium and provide military assistance to the empire in exchange for a monetary reward. In this work, the Pechenegs were considered as potential allies of Byzantium against Rus, the Ugric peoples, Danube Bulgaria, and Great (White) Croatia.
In the epoch of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, the Pechenegs did not form a strong union, but were divided into eight tribes, each of which was headed by a ‘great archon’\(^{28}\). It is indicative that among the enemies against whom the empire expected to use the Pechenegs, there was no Khazaria. This evidence can be considered as an indirect confirmation of the fact that some Pechenegs were under Khazar’s influence\(^{29}\).

Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus also informs about alliance agreements between the Pechenegs and the Rus. Long campaigns of Kyivan princes were generally possible only under conditions of peaceful relations with the Pechenegs\(^{30}\). Ibn Hawqal also tells about Rus’ alliance with the Pechenegs\(^{31}\).

The question of identifying “a large group of Turks” can be resolved in another way. The ‘Cambridge Document’ describes Byzantine-Khazar relations as a series of conflicts provoked by Byzantine diplomacy. Three generations of Khazar rulers (khagans Benjamin, Aaron, and Joseph) faced coalitions organized with the support of Constantinople, in which the Rus and the Pechenegs took part\(^{32}\). It is quite probable that studying the campaign of 965, we should consider it not as an independent political event organized in Kyiv, but as a part of the coalition war against Khazaria under the auspices of Byzantium.

The Oghuz could also be a member of a similar coalition. Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus considered them enemies of Khazaria, who could attack the Khaganate. But he did not rule out the fact that the Oghuz could attack the Pechenegs as well\(^{33}\). Probably, in the latter case, we see the aftermath of the old Oghuz-Pecheneg conflicts of the 9th – early 10th century. In the second half of the 10th century, that conflict was not so pressing problem, since the nomads of both peoples were no longer neighbors. Thus, in 965, the Oghuz and the Pechenegs could act together with Sviatoslav’s troops against the Khazars, and this assumption explains the problem with their identification in the historical works of Ibn Miskawayh and Ibn al-Athir (“a large group of Turks”).

Ibn Hawqal described the second Rus’ campaign in the Volga region, which took place in 968-969\(^{34}\). That military operation could have involved both contingents from Kyiv, which used the shores of the Dnipro-Buh estuary to re-equip ships, and garrisons of Tamantarkhan and Sarkel, which could stay there after the campaign of 965.

Thus, the analysis of written sources and the international context of the eastern policy of Prince Sviatoslav of Kyiv allows us to state that the military operations of Rus troops against Khazaria can be combined into two campaigns that are of 965 and 968-969. The route of those campaigns passed along the ancient waterway, which connected the Middle Dnipro region with the Caspian Sea. Waypoints of that route can be considered being the Dnipro trade route, the Black and Azov Seas, the Don and Volga rivers. An important place on this route was taken by the Dnipro-Buh estuary and its

\(^{28}\) Ibid. С. 154-157.
\(^{30}\) Константин Багрянородний. Об управлении империей... С. 38-39.
\(^{31}\) Калинина Т.М. Сведения Ибн Хаукала о походах руси времен Святослава... С. 242.
\(^{32}\) Коковцов П.К. Еврейско-хазарская переписка в Х веке... С. 116-120; Голб Н., Прицак О. Хазарско-еврейские документы X века... С. 140-142.
\(^{33}\) Константин Багрянородний. Об управлении империей... С. 50-51.
\(^{34}\) Древняя Русь в свете зарубежных источников: Хрестоматия. Т. III... С. 88-89.
coast, in particular the island of St. Epheria (Berezan) and the Biloberezhzhia. It was there that Sviatoslav’s troops made a stop for rest and re-equipping of ships for seafaring. Probably, in 965, Sviatoslav’s allies were “a large group of Turks.” The latter could be recognized as a combined contingent of Oghuz and Pechenegs or detachments of one of those tribes. The campaign of 965 could enjoy the support of Byzantium, which during the 10th century considered Khazaria its competitor in the struggle for influence in the region.

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У статті досліджуються дискусійні аспекти східної політики Київської Русі часів правління князя Святослава (964-972). Особлива увага приділяється походам руських військ проти Хазарського каганату, склад їх учасників, вплив візантійської дипломатії на їх організацію, свідчення джерел стосовно географії військових дій і ролі, що відігрівав регіон Дніпровсько-Бузького лиману, як сполучна ланка на водному шляху русів до Каспійського моря.

Аналіз письмових джерел i міжнародного контексту східної політики київського князя Святослава дозволяє стверджувати, що дії руських загонів проти Хазарії можна поєднати у два походи – 965 і 968-969 років. Маршрут цих походів проходив давньою водною комунікацією, що поєднувала Середнє Подніпров'я з Каспійським морем. Складовими цього маршруту можна вважати Дніпровський шлях, Чорне та Азовське море, річки Дон та Волгу.

Важливе місце на цьому маршруті відігрівав Дніпровсько-Бузький лиман і його узбережжя, зокрема о. Св. Ефросія (Березань) і Білобережжя. Саме тут загони Святослава робили зупинку для відпочинку та переобладнання суден перед морським плаванням. Вірогідно, у 965 р. союзниками Святослава виступала «велика група тюрків». В останніх можна бачити як об’єднані контингенти огузів і печенігів, так і загони одного з цих племен. Похід 965 р. міг користуватись і підтримкою Візантії, яка протягом Х ст. розглядала Хазарію власним конкурентом у боротьбі за вплив у регіоні.

**Ключові слова:** Дніпровсько-Бузький лиман, Київська Русь, Хазарія, огузи, печеніги

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